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15.1 The Gold Standard from the Viewpoint
of Prospective Adherents
Bills were pending in the parliaments of Austria and Hungary in 1892
to put those countries on the gold standard. In Austria, Deputy Anton
Menger, a lawyer and brotherofthe economist Carl Menger, was chosen
to sum up the pro-gold-standard position atcertain stages ofthe debates.
Anton Menger tried to refute the objection of the critics that gold, like
the paper gulden, could be unstable in value-perhaps even more un-
stable. His economist brother, although also in favor of the gold stan-
dard, recognized that it had some "undeniable disadvantages," including
the instability in the value ofgold and especially its rise in value in recent
decades. The paper gulden, he recognized, had been satisfactorily stable
in value for domestic business (Menger 1936, p. 123).1 By the value of
gold and value ofthe gulden, Carl Menger, as well as the actual critics of
the gold standard, clearly meant purchasing power.
Anton Menger evidently did not understand this. He ~uffered not
merely from a money illusion but from a pound-sterling illusion spe-
cifically. Anyone can see how stable gold has been, he told critics, ifthey
would take the trouble to look at a statistical table of its price on the
London market from 1878 to 1891. He conceded that some fluctuations
had occurred.
Do you know how large these were? The greatest change amounted to
0.13 per cent. What a difference? In one year our money notes have
changed in money-value by about ten per cent, while gold, over the
course ofa period of12 to 13 years, has changed only by 0.13 percent.
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Under such circumstances there is no doubt at all that there can be no
question at all of comparing banknotes with gold in regard to the
function ofmeasure ofvalue. (Austria, Parliament, Chamber ofDep-
uties 1892, p. 7182)2
Evidently, then, the economic understanding of his brother Carl had
not automatically rubbed off onto Deputy Anton Menger.
I thought I might say something tonight about the image ofthe gold
standardin the late nineteenth century. I'll look at it from the standpoint
oflegislators, economists/ and pamphleteers in countries that were con-
templating a move onto gold, namely, Austria-Hungary and Russia.
These countries had fiat paper moneys, having been inflated off oftheir
traditionalsilverstandardsseveral decadesearlierby paper-moneyissues
to cover the expenses of wars and revolutions.
15.2 Arguments Pro and Con
Automatic regulation of the money supply was one ofthe advantages
moststrongly arguedin Austriain favor ofthe gold standard. Incountries
with a sound monetary system, Carl Menger explained, money flows out
ifcommoditypricesrise andin ifprices fall appreciablyin relation to their
normal level. It was a defect of Austria's isolated monetary system that
flows of money and gold could not fill temporary gaps inthe balance of
payments, so that balance had to be maintained entirely in goods and
securities. Domestic business suffered because its changing needs for
money confronted an inadequately elastic paper-money supply. "We
lack the mechanically operating, regulating influence of the inflow of
money onto our markets; for this reason, we have apathetic, insensitive
commodity markets; prices in Austria are not calculated precisely, as in
England or Holland; we have apathetic markets, which paralyzes the
spirit of enterprise" (Menger 1936, p. 294).4
Carl Menger recognized that the typical European currency was not a
goldcurrencybuta "gold-plated"one. Ithadacoreofpaper, surrounded
by layers of minor coins and silver and then with an outer layer of gold
plating. This arrangementwas goodenoughfor him, providedtheplating
was strong enough to resist the acid test of financial crisis. What he
wanted was stable exchange rates (p. 247).
In Hungary, Istvan Tisza expressed similar ideas: A paper-money
country experiences no significant inflows and outflows of money. "In
gold-standardcountries, ontheotherhand, thesize oftheneedfor gold is
decisive." Rich or populous countries need more media of exchange,
poor or less populous ones need less.
The relation between quantity and need must be such that in both
places they are equal; and money even goes from therichest countryto653 The Image of the Gold Standard
the poorestifthere is relatively greaterneedfor it there, for thenit can
be turned to better account there; and the elements of the balance of
payments will necessarily change as the relation between the quantity
of and need for gold requires.... The tendency of balances of pay-
ments will always be . . . to equalize the relation betweendemand and
supplyin all countriesand give all as muchgold as they needin relation
to the needs of others. (Tisza 1890, pp. 92-93)
Its Austrian supporters saw the gold standard less as a transmitter of
foreign disturbances thanas a meansofcushioningdomestic disturbances
by linkage with the presumably more stable world economy. Franz Perl
wrote in 1887 that
in the isolation in which our currency places us, we are left to our
own resources whenever credit is shaken; that international flow of
money which stands helpfully at the side of other money markets in
times of need is lacking to us; our securities, which only in rare cases
have a real abode abroad, return to us at the least sign ofmistrust; we
lack that equilibrating help. (Perl 1887, p. 64, citing Alfred von Lind-
heim)
Deputy Anton Menger also believed that business crises were "very
considerablyintensified" by the inability ofmoney toflow into andoutof
Austria, a monetaryisland. Thevalue ofAustrianmoneyrestedonlyona
very dangerous basis, its scarcity, for a country should have enough
money and not too little (Austria, Parliament, Chamber of Deputies
1892, pp. 7182-83).
Another deputy (Eim) pointed out that the value of a paper money
depended on the need for money and on the amount in circulation. The
latter could be controlled, but the need for money could hardly be
calculated. Thus, the value of paper money "is subject to continual
changes, which depend on the most various circumstances, often on
chance, indeed even on speculation (p. 6989).
The economist Julius Landesberger likewise saw it as a grave defect of
a system ofpurely fiduciary money that it could not work well "unless it
were continuously possible to ascertain most reliably the need of the
whole economy for means of circulation at all times and to regulate the
monetarycirculationcorrespondingly. To this, however, the resources of
science are not adequate today" (Landesberger 1892, p. 68).5
Russian supporters of gold also argued that that standard made a
country's money supply appropriately elastic. Under a paper system, by
contrast, themoneysupplysupposedlydid notrespondappropriately and
automatically to the changing need for means of circulation; yet it was
impossible to calculate and deliberately meet that need. In a gold-
standard country, though, a deficiency of the domestic money supply
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of gold, and a superabundance of money would remedy itself through a
deficit and an outflow. Each country would automatically come to hold
the quantityofmetallicmoneyappropriateto its wealth andtransactions,
without anyone's having to try to estimate the required quantity.6
Opponents of the gold standard sometimes argued that the sacrifices
required to get onto gold would prove to have been in vain in case
Austria-Hungaryshouldgetinto anotherwar. Theprogoldreplywas that
the country should have hard money in peacetime to save the possibility
ofpaper-moneyissues-thestate's "notecredit"-forwartime. With the
country having a depreciated paper money even in time of peace, said
Perl (1887, p. 29), every economist and patriot must shudder to think of
what would happen in time of war or fear of war.
In Russia, also, gold standardopponents argued that monetary reform
would not be worth the trouble, since a new war would only make the
papermoney irredeemable again. Thereplywas thatirredeemablepaper
money should be abolished now so that new issues could be put into
circulation ifthe occasion arose. The currency reform could be a "recon-
struction of war material" (Schultze-Gavernitz 1899, p. 462). Starting
from the gold standard, the government would have better wartime
financial alternatives than if it started from irredeemability.
Early in 1879, when the world-market price of silver had sunk so low
that the Austrian gulden was again worth as much as its supposed silver
content, or even slightly more, the coinage of silver on private account
threatened to inflate the money supply and price level. The Austrian and
Hungarian governments responded by closing their mints to the free
coinage of silver. That action had been taken in a legally very informal
way, however, leaving thepossibility thatthe silver standardwould come
alive again. Forsome years the gulden floated at a value above that ofits
supposed silver content.
By 1890, a different aspect of the loose link remaining between the
gulden and silver-one working through speculation about domestic
redemption and coinage policy and American silver-purchase policy-
came to the fore, providing one ofthe strongest motives to reform. The
Austrian financial press and Parliament seemed preoccupied with the
progress of the Sherman Silver Purchase Bill in the U.S. Congress, and
unusual day-to-day jumpsin theprice ofsilver and the gulden's exchange
rate were generally attributed to news from Washington.
.Finance Minister Steinbach warned Parliament on 14 May 1892 that
f@rces supporting andopposingfree coinage ofsilver in the United States
were almost evenly balanced; powerful influences on the Austrian cur-
rency could come from that direction. "The rate fluctuations ofthe year
1890, which you all remember, gentlemen, have brought us a small
foretaste ofwhat would happen if silver coinage were made free today in655 The Image of the Gold Standard
the United States ofNorth America" (Austria, Parliament, Chamber of
Deputies 1892, p. 5930).
Another aspect of legal untidiness was the existence of four distinct
types or concepts of gulden: (1) the ordinary fiat gulden ("gulden of
Austrian currency"), in which currency and bank deposits were denomi-
nated and in which most prices and debts were expressed; (2) the silver
gulden, inwhich some bonds andpreferredstockswere still denominated
and which could again become separated from the ordinary gulden if
silver rose sufficiently in market value; (3) a gold gulden worth two-and-
a-half French francs, in which some bonds and customs payments were
expressed; and (4) anothergoldgulden, worth 1.2percentless, which had
some slight applicationingovetnmentaccounting; itwas thegold equiva-
lentofthestandardsilvergulden atthe 15.5:1 bimetallicratiooftheLatin
Monetary Union. As Josef Kreibig later observed, "if there was one
drastic proofofthe necessity ofa reform, it was this peculiar splitting of
the monetary unit" (Kreibig 1899, pp. 61-62).
15.3 Climates of Opinion
Dominant Hungarian interests switched in favor ofgold around 1889-
90. Earlier they had opposed it out offear that it meant appreciation of
the paper gulden to equality with the two-and-a-half-franc gold gulden,
hampering agricultural exports. But as the Hungarians came·to realize
thatthe gulden would not be pegged upward atthat rate and thatthegold
standard might mean resistance to further appreciation, oreven a partial
reversal of recent appreciation, the sentiment of the country's export-
and import-competing interests shifted.
7
It seems that the experts, so considered by the Establishment, were
almost all in favor of the gold standard. Being an expert (and so being
invited to testify before the commissions mentioned in footnote 3)
apparently presupposed, almost by definition, advocacy ofthe gold stan-
dard. None of the major Austrian political parties, as a party, opposed
the gold standard, although many individual deputies did. Even propo-
nents of the gold standard recognized that a large opposition existed-
and that opponents might possibly outnumber proponents-but outside
the most influential circles. The masses had supposedly become accus-
tomedto theexistingcurrencysituationandwere apatheticabout reform.
Among the articulate, though, advocacy ofgold dominated. A propaper
pamphleteer suggested a version of the fable of the emperor's clothes:
evenpeoplewho did notunderstandthesupposeddisadvantagesofpaper
money and the supposed advantages of gold nevertheless joined the
progold chorus in order not to seem unenlightened (Gruber 1892, pp.
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Even so, opposition consumed most of the time in the parliamentary
debates. This was understandable: the government's position took the
form of definite bills, and only so much could be said in their favor
without repetition, while opposition views were aired in great variety.
Onlya minorityoftheopponentsforthrightly favored retainingfiat paper
money. Most of them wanted bimetallism, or thought that the time was
not ripe for the gold standard, or believed that action should await some
sortofinternationalagreement, orwanted agold standarddifferentfrom
what the government's bills would introduce, or engaged in nit-picking
about such issues as the emperor's titles on the new gold coins. The only
amendment adoptedwas one expanding his titles from Imperatoret Rex
to a long list including King of Bohemia, King of Gallicia, and ending
with Apostolic King of Hungary.
Some pamphleteers did state the case for retaining a fiat paper money
with floating exchange rates---a case centered aroundthe greaterimport-
ance ofdomestic than ofexchange-rate stability and the importance ofa
measure of insulation from foreign deflation and crises. Josef Neupauer
predictedthat"aslow and steadyincrease in the means ofcirculationwill
without doubtencourage the spirit ofenterprise, and all the more remain
without influence on the price of the Austrian money as indeed the
population grows and the whole economy develops." He proposed that
the new money necessaryto accompanyrealeconomicgrowth be putinto
circulation through purchase of securities on the Bourse. He even
hazarded a guess about the proper rate of annual increase in the money
supply-4 percent (Neupauer 1892, p. 26 and passim).
Dominant trends ofopinion were apparently quite different in Russia.
The discussions ofthe Imperial Free Economic Society in St. Petersburg
in March-April 1896 (cited in note 3) serve as evidence that advocacy of
the gold standard was notpart ofthe conventional wisdom among econ-
omists and leading thinkers. Even advocates of the gold standard ac-
knowledged that apathy toward the reform was quite general.
Schulze-Gavernitz referred to those discussions to justify his assertion
that "the State carried out the currency reform against public opinion,
with few exceptions, againstthe press, againstthe tough resistance ofthe
public" (Schulze-Gavernitz 1899, pp. 461-62, 470-71).
Finance Minister Sergei Witte also testified to the climate of opinion.
As he said, nearly the whole ofthinking Russia was initially opposed to
his reform. Even he, while new in office, contemplated abandoning his
predecessors' work of moving toward the gold standard.
8
The opposition to the gold standard was so strong in Russia that in
order to enact it, the Tsar had to bypass the usual legislative procedure,
which involved various committees. Supporting his finance minister, the
Tsar enacted it piecemeal by autocratic decrees.
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15.4 Noneconomic Motives
Before turning to the noneconomic reasons for adoption of the gold
standard, particularly in Austria, I want to emphasize that the economic
reasons did notinclude poor performance ofthe fiat paper currency (see
Yeager 1969, pp. 61-89). Exchange-rate fluctuations were not e.xtreme
by present-daystandards, and the papercurrencywas not suffering price
inflation. (In fact, the price trend had been downward since about 1871,
though less steeply downward than in the gold standard world.)
Yet Deputy Anton Menger complained. He said that importers and
exporters were able to perceive seasonal tendencies in the exchange
rate-very feeble tendencies, so far as the figures show-andprofit from
them by shrewdly timing their purchases and sales offoreign exchange.
This sounds like stabilizing speculation to us-hardly grounds for com-
plaint. Yet Mengerimplied, without articulatinghis complaint explicitly,
that the gains of the shrewd traders were necessarily coming at the
expense of the country as a whole (Austria, Parliament, Chamber of
Deputies 1892, p. 7473). The gold standard would put a stop to that.
Apartfrom the economics ofthe matter, the fluctuating exchange rate
was widely viewed as a symbol of disorder and backwardness, whereas
beingonthe goldstandard-themost modernmonetarysystem-wasthe
mark of a civilized country. Vienna's leading newspaper deplored the
monarchy's confused monetary system-with silver as the basic metal,
with irredeemable papernotes in circulation, andwith the gulden'svalue
exposed to the vicissitudes of wild international speculation-"while all
civilized states have long since assured themselves ofa stable measure of
value, a money as steady in value as possible" (Neue Freie Presse, 7
September 1890).10
Considerations of prestige were at work. In the Hungarian Currency
Inquiry of 1892, Koloman Szell, a former finance minister and future
prime minister, declaimed about "the stigma of a paper economy, un-
worthy of a civilized nation" (quoted in Gruber 1892, p. 117). The
Currency Committee of the Austrian Parliament observed in 1892 that
"considerationsofstate [had] influencedthedecisionofthe government"
to proceed with gold-standard legislation. Twenty years before, Austria
had not been alone in using paper money; since then the United States,
Italy, and even little Rumania had gone onto the gold standard. Russia,
the only other major power still with a paper standard, was already
making preparations for going onto gold. "Every year it detracts more
from theStateprestigeofAustriathatitstill belongs tothecountrieswith
an unregulated currency" (Austria, Parliament, Chamber of Deputies
1892, Rei/age no. 491, p. 8).
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economy" degraded Austria economically to a second-rate power. "We
demonstrate that our Empire does not·have the strength to introduce
amongus, too, themeansofpayment, hardmoney, thatholdsswayin the
civilized world. We therebyincessantlydamage ourcredit, oureconomic
flexibility and competitiveness." Lack of foreign confidence extended
beyond the economic sphere into
all other sides of our international relations; it lessens respect for us,
esteem for us; it lessens our power position. We must therefore make
all effortstobringthestrengthofourMonarchyintofull effect again by
regulating our monetary system.... We cannot have a separate, an
insular, currencycontinue: ifwe wanttotakepartin thecompetitionof
civilized nations, we too must accept the international means of pay-
ment, and the international measure of value is just nowadays gold.
(Pp. 7132-33)
The "scrapofpaper" to which Dr. Foreggeralludedwas itselfa source
of dismay. The state currency notes (as distinguished from the notes of
theAustro-HungarianBank)werethoughtofas anactual debttobepaid
off sooner or later. This view found support not only in linkage of the
legally permissible quantities of state notes and treasury bills
(Salinenscheine) under a ceiling on their combined amount but also in
the inscription on the notes themselves, which acknowledged each note
as "apart ofthe common floating debt ofthe Austro-Hungarian Monar-
chy" ("common" here meaning shared by the two governments). The
term "floating debt" sounds more ominous in German than in English-
schwebende Schuld--eonveying the impression ofa "hovering guilt" still
to be expiated. Oneofthe purposesofthemonetaryreformbills of1892,
theAustriangovernmentsaid, was toabolishthesestatenotes, whichhad
been issued under the compulsion of "shattering political events" (Au-
stria, Parliament, ChamberofDeputies, Beilage no. 436). The reference
was to monetary inflation during the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. The
yearning to banish an ever-presentreminderofthe humiliation ofKonig-
gratzwas anoldone. On1November1884 theNeue Freie Presse saidthat
"redeemingthefloating debt" was "anold dutyofhonorofAustria." On
1January 1892 the newspaper lamented "the dismal legacy ofrevolution
and wars, the irredeemable notes, these hateful stains on the name of
Austria.... The paper gulden is ... [a] sad monument that has been
erected in our budget to remind us of the sufferings of the past."
Eventhe analytical Carl Menger "mostdecidedly" rejected "the opin-
ion ofthosewho denyAustria-Hungarythe right to reshape hercurrency
onthepatternofthatofthecivilized nations. Itshouldnotbeinterpreted
as immodesty if we too wish to be counted among the 'nations les plus
avancees dans la civilisation,' among the nations that are already 'ready
for gold,' and not among the peoples'ofthe other currency area,' which659 The Image of the Gold Standard
should content themselves with silver currency" (Menger 1936, pp. 172-
73).
Amongits advocates in Russia, the gold standard "hadbecome, in the
midnineties, more than ever a matter of national respectability and
economic advantage....For Russia (as for any civilized country at that
time) it was a prerequisite for sound credit and economic progress in
general. Above all it would encourage more foreign investment in Rus-
sian industry" (Von Laue 1963, p. 139).
A. N. Gurjevwasoneoftheeconomistswhoheldsucha view. Forhim,
restoration of the ruble to a metallic basis had political and cultural as
well as economic significance:
Membership in worldwide civilization is unthinkable without mem-
bership in the worldwide monetary economy. . . . A country with an
isolated monetary economy cannot enter into stable cultural inter-
course ifit is separatedfrom civilized peoples by thewhole complex of
economic evils connected with the disorder of the monetary system
(Gurjev 1896, p. 163).
Finally, we have the judgment of an eminent Austrian economist of a
latergeneration. Moderneconomists will be quite unable to understand,
said Joseph Schumpeter, why countries such as Austria-Hungary, Rus-
sia, and Italy imposed hardships on themselves to adopt gold parities for
their currencies. No important economic interests clamored for that
policy. Noneconomic considerations were decisive. Gold symbolized
sound practice and honor and decency. "Perhaps this explanation raises
moreproblemsthanitsolves. Thatitis trueis certain" (Schumpeter1954,
p. 770).
15.5 Some Reflections about This Conference
Now I'll make a sharp change ofcourse. Toward the endofmy talk I'll
return to the theme of the image of the gold standard.
When Professor Michael Bordo invited me to speak this evening, he
suggested that I might want to reflect on what we had learned from the
conferencepapersandfrom the discussion. I was particularlyglad tohear
what Donald McCloskey and Richard Zecherhave to say aboutpurchas-
ing-powerparity. (Ihastento addthatacceptingpurchasing-powerparity
does notnecessarilyimplyacceptingtheextremeversionofthemonetary
approach to the balance of payments, which identifies a balance-of-
payments deficit with a process ofworking offan excess supplyofmoney
and identifies a surplus with a process ofsatisfying an excess demand for
money.)
Purchasing-power parity is one ofthe few dependable generalizations
that we have in economics. It is a generalization about the range within660 Leland B. Yeager
which a floating exchange rate tends to fluctuate and about what relation
has to holdbetweenpricesin differentcountriesifa fixed exchange rateis
to remain workable. Purchasing-power parity should not be understood
to deny that otherfactors influence exchange rates orinternational price
relations, includingspecifichistoricalfactors such as the "countryrisk" of
investmentinItaliansecuritiesthatMicheleFratianniandFrancoSpinelli
spoke of.
Yet there seems to be a passion among more than a few economists to
deny orquestion ourmost dependable generalizations, perhaps by inter-
preting them in so exaggerated and rigid a way that they are not strictly
true. Other examples are the treatment often accorded to the quantity
theory ofmoney and the marginal-productivity theoryofthe demandfor
laborandotherfactors. Overeagercritics needtobewarnedagainstwhat
Thomas Sowell (1980, pp. 291-92, 324) calls the precisional fallacy.
I was glad to hear McCloskey and Zecher ask, when told about the
failure of purchasing-power parity: Failure relative to what? Failure by
what standards? Failure relative to what alternative theory? (Here I am
embroidering a bit.) In dealing with their respective subject matters,
what theories are more satisfactory than the quantity theory or purchas-
ing-power parity or marginal-productivity theory? Do we really want to
say that the price level (in a country with a floating exchange rate)
depends on all sorts of influences, among which the quantity of money
plays no distinctive role? Do we want to say that the floating exchange
rate between two currencies depends on supply and demand, which
reflect the influences ofall sorts ofactual and potential transactions, and
that nothing more definite can be said? Would we want to say that no
meaningful generalization can be offered about the relation between
price levels indifferent countries undera regime offixed exchange rates?
Agreed, all sorts of influences, some more and some less bound to
specific historical circumstances, do affect a country's price level, the
relation among different countries' price levels, and the ranges within
which free exchange rates tend to fluctuate. But we are asking about
theories-generalizations. What better generalizations are available to
replace the quantity theory and the purchasing-power-parity doctrine?
Unless one can answer that, talk about their "failure" is premature.
McCloskey and Zecher took some swipes at what they call closed-
economy theorizing. I hope they do not mean that the acceptability of
purchasing-power parity actually precludes any such theorizing. For at
one stage of presenting monetary theory, it is useful and legitimate to
assume a closed economyorwhatfor thepurpose athandamountsto the
same thing, namely, an economy with an independent currency and a
floating exchange rate. We see why and how the supply of and demand
for money affect nominal income and the price level.
ll The discussion
prepares us for understanding the interrelations among money supply,
moneydemand, andthebalanceofpaymentsunderfixed exchange rates.661 The"Image of the Gold Standard
I hope that accepting purchasing-power parity does not require us to
assume that prices in each particular country under fixed exchange rates
aresimplydictatedto it bytheoutsideworld. How, then, wouldtheworld
price level be determined? How would gold discoveries under the gold
standard affect world prices? It would seem odd to maintain that the
money supply follows and responds to the externally dictated price level
in each particular country, although the money supply leads and deter-
mines the price level in the world as a whole.
To repeat, closed-economy theorizing, orsomething closely akin to it,
does have a legitimate place in explaining relations between money
supplies andprice levels. Butopen-economytheorizingis also necessary.
Some of the conference papers and commentaries have made me
wonderwhetherthere isn'ttoo much polarization knocking around-too
much discussion ofpossibly parallel oralternative economicprocesses or
aspects ofprocesses as if descriptions ofthem were the mutually contra-
dictory assertions of rival theories. An example is the supposed rivalry
between Hume's theory ofprice-level shifts, which would hold true in a
case of slight substitutability between domestic and import and export
goods, and the theory of Adam Smith and modern devotees of the
monetary approach to the balance of payments regarding how the rela-
tion between money supply and money demand affects spending and the
balance of payments directly, even apart from relative price shifts.
The monetary approach, sensibly interpreted, does not say (as Mor-
dechai Kreinin and Lawrence Officer, quoted in Michele Fratianni and
Franco Spinelli's paper, interpret it as saying) that thefamous elasticities
ofthe elasticity approach to balance-of-payments analysis are irrelevant.
Rather, the extreme monetary approach, together with its related asser-
tion that the law of one price holds strictly, carries certain implications
aboutthe elasticities: they are extremely high; goods are highly substitut-
able. In reality, ofcourse, the law ofone price does not hold strictly, and
theelasticities are notextremelyhigh; butcontemplatingthe unrealpolar
case can still be instructive.
I also suspectpolarizationbetweensupposedlyrival theoriesin someof
the "testing" we have seen for observance of the rules of the gold-
standardgame. AsFratianniandSpinellisay, anidentificationproblemis
.involved: Arechangesin the domesticcomponentofthemonetarybase a
response to or a cause ofchanges in the international component? Does
causation run/rom orto domestic assets? Shouldn't distinctions be made
between long-run and short-run behaviors with regard to rules of the
game? I'd like to echo Heywood Fleisig's call for clearness about what
disturbance is being supposed and about what is being taken as exoge-
nous and endogenous.
I conjecture that differences among what may appear to be different
theories-eoncerning, for example, Hume's price-specie mechanism,
direct-spending effects, the law of one price, the direction of causality662 Leland B. Yeager
between changes in domestic and international components of a coun-
try's monetary base, the direction of causality between price levels and
exchange rates, and different mechanisms of balance-of-payments
adjustment-do not so much indicate contradictions (to be settled by
empirical research) as, rather, reflect different assumptions and different
scenarios. The remedy for such apparent contradictions is to layout the
questions at issue precisely: What happens if such-and-such circum-
stancesprevail andifsuch-and-suchadisturbanceoccurs? Whenwe bring
historical facts and figures into a discussion about supposedly rival
theories, we should try to be clear about what questions the facts and
figures are meant to shed light on.
I suspectthatsomeofthepapersandcommentsatthis conferencehave
failed todistinguishsharplyenoughbetween(1) usingeconomictheory as
a tool ofhistorical research-as an aid to gathering, sorting, organizing,
and interpreting historical facts-and (2) appealing to history to discri-
minate between correct and incorrect economic theories. The facts
underlying or informing economic theory "ought" to be more basic,
dependable, and enduring and more firmly rooted in human nature and
the humancondition than thecontingentfacts ofspecific historical condi-
tions and episodes. I am suspicious oflooking to such contingent facts to
settle basic theoretical issues.
15.6 The Seductive Appeal of the Gold Standard
Now, in preparationfor coming to a conclusion, I want to return to my
earlierthemes. These themesconcerntheappealorthedesirability ofthe
gold standard.
Aswe know, someprominenteconomists andpoliticians nowadays are
recommending a return to the gold standard-or the adoption of what-
everit is thatthey are marketing underthatlabel. My response is notthat
we must not turn back· the clock. That hackneyed slogan betrays a
provincialism about one's own time, a shallow meliorism, a moral futur-
ism. Nor is my message that we can't turn back tl)e clock. Rather, my
message is a reminderofwhatitis thatwe would have toturnbackto. Itis
a reminder of the entire situation in which the gold standard flourished.
More exactly, perhaps, the gold-standard world is an idealized past state
of affairs.
The few, very few, decades during which the international gold stan-
dard flourished offered almost uniquely favorable conditions. Mint pars
among gold standard currencies, instead of being arbitrarily chosen,
expressed an equilibrium thathadevolved gradually betweenthemselves
and national price levels. Mildly rising world prices after 1896 facilitated
relative adjustments ofprices and wages, while the uptrend did not last
long enough-until war destroyed the system-to dissipate its possible663 The Image of the Gold Standard
benefits by becoming embodied in expectations. Relative calm in social
andpolitical affairs and the absence ofexcessively ambitious government
programs and excessive taxation all favored confidence in monetary
stability. The age of the gold standard was an age of peace, relatively.12
Hugh Rockoff suggested that the tolerably good performance of the
gold standardbeforeWorldWarI hinged onfavorable conditionsthatno
longer prevail: a corps of dedicated gold prospectors working in unex-
plored areas; absence of political interference (a laissez-faire atmos-
phere); patience with the long and uncertain lags in the response of the
gold supply to the changing demand for money.
By and large, people (in countries that happened to be on the gold
standard, anyway) were freer from government control than in any age
before or since-freer to transact business, to make investments, to
transfer funds, to travel. There is a certain charm in the reminiscences of
an old German bankerofhow, during his student days at Heidelberg, he
and some friends, one ofwhom had justcome into an inheritance, left on
theimpulse ofthe momentfor a tourofItaly, where thebankerin thefirst
town they stopped at considered it an honor to cash in gold coin the large
check written by the young stranger. There is similar charm in Jules
Verne'sstory ofPhineasFogg, who left on shortnotice for his eighty-day
tour of the world, paying his expenses from a carpetbag full of Bank of
England notes, accepted everywhere. The civility and internationality
prevalent during the age of the gold standard have such charm for us
nowadays that it seems almost sacrilege to ask whether these benefits
resulted from the gold standard or, instead, coexisted with it by mere
coincidence.
The gold standard, in short, evokes the "goodold days." This associa-
tion is well illustrated by two quotations, the first from Benjamin M.
Anderson, a lifelong champion of gold, and the second from John
Maynard Keynes, his generation's leading critic of that standard.
Thosewho have an adult'srecollection and an adult's understandingof
theworld which preceded the first World Warlook back upon it with a
great nostalgia. There was a sense of security then which has never
since existed. Progress was generally taken for granted.... We had
had a prolongedperiod in which decade after decade hadseenincreas-
ing political freedom, the progressive spread of democratic institu-
tions, the steady lifting of the standard of life for the masses of
men....
In financial matters the good faith of governments was taken for
granted....No countrytookpridein debasing its currencyas a clever
financial expedient. (Anderson 1949, pp. 3-4, 6)
What an extraordinaryepisode in theeconomicprogress ofman that
age was which came to an end in August, 1914! ... [A]ny man of
capacity or character at all exceeding the average [could escape from
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offered, at a low cost and with the least trouble, conveniences, com-
forts and amenities beyondthecompass ofthe richest andmost power-
ful monarchs ofother ages. The inhabitant of London could order by
telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products ofthe
whole earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, andreasonablyexpect
their early delivery upon his doorstep; he could at the same moment
and by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources
and new enterprises of any quarter of the world, and share, without
exertionoreventrouble, in theirprospectivefruits andadvantages....
He could secure forthwith ... cheap and comfortable means oftransit
to any country or climate without passport or other formality, could
despatch his servantto the neighboring office ofa bankfor such supply
of the precious metals as might seem convenient, and could then
proceed abroad to foreign quarters, without knowledge of their reli-
gion, language, or customs, bearing coined wealth upon his person,
and would consider himself greatly aggrieved and much surprised at
theleastinterference. But, mostimportantofall, heregardedthis state
ofaffairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of
further improvement, and any deviation from it as aberrant, scanda-
lous, and avoidable. (Keynes 1920, pp. 10-12)
Reminiscences like these reinforce my impression thatthe outbreakof
World War I was a momentous turning point and a great tragedy in the
history of the world-a tragedy all the more poignant because the war
broke out so accidentally. The building in Sarajevo near which the
assassin was standingwhen hefired thefateful shotsbearsaplaquesaying
that here, on 28 June 1914, Gavrilo Princip carried out an act expressing
resistance to tyranny and the will to freedom. The inscription says noth-
ing about the initiation of a chain of events that may, even yet, carry to
the destruction ofWestern civilization. It says nothing about the start of
our present age of wars, of globally expansionist tyrannies, and of the
perversion of democratic government into an instrument whereby each
interest group seeks to plunder society in general, to the unintended net
loss of practically all.
IfI were asked for my recommendation, therefore, I would not merely
recommend going back to the gold standard. By itself, apart from res-
torationofitspreconditions, thatwouldhardlybeaconstructivestep. My
nostalgia is for the whole pre-1914 climate, notfor onespecific facet ofit.
I recommend repealing World War I, root and branch. Ifonly we could!
15.7 Attitudes Necessary for Sound Money
Repealing World War I would have to include restoring certain atti-
tudes thatseemto have beenmoreprevalentin public affairs before 1914
than they are now. Those attitudes favored limitations on the scope of
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the instrumentality ofgovernment. Broadly speaking, these were liberal
attitudes in the nineteenth-centurysense. These attitudes have now been
undermined in ways analyzed, in part, by Ortega y Gasset in The Revolt
ofthe Masses.
Nowadays, we have tyrannyin the nondemocraticcountries and, in the
democratic countries, democracy perverted in such a way that political
decisions are made out of short-run expediency and without due regard
for long-run consequences. But in the gold-standard era, as Lars lonung
says, "the democratic system had not beep. fully developed." (Peter
Lindert detects signs of the perversion of democracy in the United
Kingdom, however, even before World War I.)
Without a returnto liberal attitudes andself-restraints, a restoredgold
standard would not work well and would hardly endure. After all, the
gold standard is simply a particular set of rules for policy regarding the
monetary system; and these rules are no more inherently self-enforcing
than any other set ofmonetary rules. Michele Fratianni has been telling
us of the readiness of Italian politicians to throw out the gold standard,
and Peter Lindert has noted the propensity of the gold standard and
key-currency systems to collapse when shocked. (Even today, before we
have gone back to a supposed gold standard, there is plentyofreason for
suspectingthatwhat ~f\meofits supportersareadvocatingis nota realbut
a pseudo gold standard, to echo a distinction made by Milton Friedman
[1961, pp. 66-79].)
Maybe some hope is to be found in constitutional restraints on govern-
ment taxing and spending, maybe in the depoliticization of money. It
would be outside my assignment to discuss these possibilities tonight. My
purpose, rather, has been to set our examination of the classical gold
standard into the context ofthe conditions and attitudes that apparently
prevailed at the time.
Given the required attitudes and the related restraints ongovernment,
thegoldstandardis notthe onlysetofmonetaryarrangementsthatwould
function tolerably well. Economists can easily imagine, and have pro-
posed, monetary arrangements that would function better.
Therequired attitudes were illustrated in Austriaeven while the coun-
try was still on fiat papermoney. The government and the financial press
repeatedly agonized even over budget deficits that would seem de-
lightfully small to us today. Although the price level was generallysteady
oreven trending mildly downward (except during wars and immediately
afterward), the government and the press worried about the value of
money as reflected in the exchange rate. (Nowadays, attention would
more suitably focus on a price index.) The Neue Freie Presse took
exchange rates of 120 guldens or higher for ten pounds sterling as a
particularly ominous warning.
I will conclude with three quotations from that newspaper.666 Leland B. Yeager
London: 120! A cannon shot cannot shock us more than this figure;
and it also forms an urgent warning for the many finance ministers of
the Monarchy to maintain moderation, to retrench, to resume the
policy ofsoundness....When the exchange rates, this manometerof
credit, rise, then it is better to reefin the sails a bit. Is it really ourfate
eternally to bear the mark of shame of a disordered currency? Will
there nevercomea chancellorofthetreasurywho will havethewill and
also the powerto restore the most important basis ofthe economy? (14
October 1883)
The price offoreign bills is the loudest and gravest accusation against
the government. . . . [When the opposition parties] want to depict the
sad condition ofthe state with one stroke, then they need only unfold
the Cursblatt [sic] andsay: Thingshave gone prettyfar in Austriawhen
one franc equals half ofour gulden on the world market. ... what the
ghosts were for poor Macbeth, the foreign exchanges are for [Finance
Minister] Dunajewski; indeed, we are convinced that he often wakes
up at night, terrified, and suddenly perceives a figure before him that
mockingly hisses at him: London 126.50! (26 April 1885)
To introduce my final quotation, I should explain that the Austrian
police from time to time confiscated issues of publications containing
articles considered too critical ofthe government. The Neue Freie Presse
occasionally carried a notice on its front page saying that its preceding
issue had been confiscated. (To compensate its subscribers, the newspa-
per would either reprint the confiscated issue without the offending
material or else make the next issue especially large.) In one of its
editorials denouncing the confiscations, the paper complained about
discrimination, as well: Unlike itself, the official Coursblattofthe Vienna
Bourse had never been confiscated. Yet its latest issue quoted London
exchange at 120.95. "And if we were to write our fingers sore, we could
not portray the situation more precisely. Cqnfiscate the Cursblatt [sic],
Mr. Attorney General" (26 February 1882).
Notes
1. Cf. Menger 1936, pp. 147, 196, 233-34.
2. The quotation is from the 14 July 1892 transcript. Menger had previously used the
same argument on 25 May, p. 6192.
3. These includesome oftheexpertwitnesses testifying beforecommissionsconvokedin
Vienna and Budapest in March 1892 and in St. Petersburg in March-April 1896. See
Austria, Wahrungs-Enquete Commission 1892; Imperatorskoe Voljnoe .Ekonomicheskoe
Obshchestvo 1896.
4. Cf. Menger 1936, pp. 138-39, 226--27.
5. Landesberger thus seemed to imply that if the supply of a fiat money could be
regulated appropriately, exchange-rate fluctuations would notcount decisively against that667 The Image of the Gold Standard
system. Some people, he noted, even considered the fluctuations a desirable insulator
against price deflation in gold countries.
6. These arguments are reported in Vlasenko 1963, pp. 85-86; Raffalovich 1896, p. 369;
Trakhtenberg 1962, pp. 174ft; and Finance Minister Witte's bill to authorize contracts in
gold currency, quoted in Saenger 1927, p. 16.
7. Vienna Board of Trade 1887, p. 388; Kamitz 1949, pp. 147-48; Aktionar, 22 June
1890, first supplement, dispatch from Prague; Silin 1913, pp. 394, 395, 399, quoted and
paraphrased at length in Trakhtenberg 1962, pp. 265-66. Tisza (1890, esp. pp. 93-95)
explained the incorrectness of the earlier fears and argued that the gold standard would
serve Hungarian interests.
8. Witte 1921, pp. 59-60; cf. Von Laue 1963; Crisp 1967, p. 211; Migulin 1899-1904, pp.
130-31.
9. Witte 1921, pp. 59,61; Von Laue 1963, pp. 141-44; Migulin 1899-1904, pp. 284-86;
Trakhtenberg 1962, p. 267; Russia, Finance Ministry 1902, 2: pp. 422-25.
10. Earlier (1 November 1884) thesame newspaperhadexclaimed, "Whatenthusiasmit
would stir up ifat last the warmly longed-for moment had arrived to raise Austria onto the
height of the civilized states!"
11. This process was so clearly described by Knut Wicksell back in 1898 that I propose
calling it the "Wicksell process" (to be distinguished from his "cumulative process," which
is rather different). See Wicksell 1965, pp. 39-41.
12. TheNeue Freie Presse (Vienna) andAktionar(Berlin), bothevidentorgansofliberal
bourgeois thought, repeatedly stressed that peace was good for business.
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